By Vincent Ufuoma
On 18 March 2025, President Bola Tinubu declared a state of emergency in Rivers State, suspending Governor Siminalayi Fubara, his deputy, and all elected lawmakers for six months. The government cited political instability and security concerns, appointing Vice Admiral Ibokette Ibas (Rtd.) as the state’s military administrator.
The President cited Section 305 of the amended 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria as the legal foundation for his declaration. This section empowers the President to declare a state of emergency in any part of the country under specific circumstances, such as:
Section 305(3)(c): When there is a breakdown of public order and public safety in the Federation or any part thereof to such extent as to require extraordinary measures to restore peace and security.
Section 305(3)(d): When there is a clear and present danger of an actual breakdown of public order and public safety in the Federation or any part thereof requiring extraordinary measures to avert such danger.
His proclamation was subsequently approved by both chambers of the National Assembly, as mandated by the Constitution on 20 March 2025.
The President’s move has sparked widespread condemnation, with critics calling it an unconstitutional power grab.
Critics argue that while Section 305 allows for the declaration of a state of emergency, it does not grant the President the authority to suspend or remove elected officials. They argued that the action sets a dangerous precedent for the future of Nigeria’s democracy if state governments can be dissolved at will by the presidency.
Former Vice-President Atiku Abubakar described it as an “assault on democracy,” while the Nigeria Civil Society Situation Room, a coalition of over 70 civil society groups, warned that it undermines democratic governance.
Similarly, the Nigerian Bar Association (NBA) contended that the suspension of the governor and state lawmakers is unconstitutional, as the Constitution does not provide the President with such powers, even during a state of emergency.
Lessons from the Philippines and Peru: The Dangers of Weakening Democracy
If unchecked, Nigeria’s current trajectory risks mirroring the fate of nations where executive overreach progressively eroded democratic norms. The cases of the Philippines under Rodrigo Duterte and Peru under Alberto Fujimori serve as cautionary tales of what happens when democratic institutions are systematically weakened.
The Duterte Playbook
Elected in 2016, Duterte consolidated power through a mix of executive overreach, media suppression, and militarisation, eventually steering the country towards authoritarian rule. His tenure was marked by an erosion of democratic institutions, a crackdown on dissent, and the use of state power to silence opposition.
A striking similarity between Duterte’s strategy and Tinubu’s current approach is the undermining of democratic institutions. Duterte systematically weakened the legislature and judiciary, ensuring that all decisions favoured his presidency. The suspension of elected officials in Rivers State signals a similar disregard for constitutional checks and balances in Nigeria. Another parallel is the increasing crackdown on press freedom. Duterte shut down ABS-CBN, the Philippines’ largest media network, and harassed critical journalists. Since President Tinubu assumed office on May 29, 2023, press freedom in Nigeria has faced significant challenges, with 37 cases of press freedom violations recorded by June 2024. Security agents have been responsible for numerous unlawful arrests and detentions of journalists, contributing to a climate of fear and censorship. These incidents show a troubling decline.
Duterte’s governance was marked by the appointment of military officials to key civilian positions, reinforcing his strongman approach to power. He neutralised political threats, suppressed dissent, and consolidated control. Although Tinubu’s selection of a retired military officer to govern Rivers State has not amount to full-scale militarisation, critics are worried that Nigeria could follow a similar trajectory to the Philippines under Duterte.
Peru’s Warning: The Fujimori Model of Authoritarianism
Alberto Fujimori’s case in Peru provides another cautionary tale. Elected in 1990, Fujimori used emergency powers to dissolve Congress and take full control of the state. He justified his actions as necessary to restore order amid political and economic instability.
Like Duterte, Fujimori undermined democratic institutions, using state security forces to neutralise political threats, suppress dissent, and consolidate control. His government carried out widespread human rights abuses, enforced disappearances, and extrajudicial killings, particularly targeting opposition leaders, activists, and journalists. Notably, he was convicted for his role in the Barrios Altos and La Cantuta massacres, where 25 individuals were killed by death squads under his regime.
He also orchestrated a sophisticated disinformation campaign and weaponised anti-terrorism laws to detain opponents and journalists under false charges. His rule ultimately led to long-term political instability, even after his removal. His legacy of institutional erosion made Peru vulnerable to continued corruption and weak governance. Nigeria risks a similar cycle of executive dominance if democratic safeguards are not reinforced.
Humanitarian Costs: A Deadly Legacy
Duterte’s infamous “War on Drugs” led to over 12,000 extrajudicial killings, with at least 2,555 deaths directly attributed to the Philippine National Police. Most of the victims were urban poor, falsely accused or executed without trial. Human rights organisations such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International described this as the worst human rights crisis in the Philippines since the dictatorship of Ferdinand Marcos in the 1970s and 1980s. The violence extended beyond drug-related killings. Human rights defenders were increasingly targeted, facing threats, attacks, and assassinations under Duterte’s rule. The government systematically used the Anti-Terror Law to brand activists, journalists, and political opponents as “communists” or “terrorists,” leading to arbitrary arrests and enforced disappearances.
Duterte’s administration also eroded press freedom. His government shutdown ABS-CBN, the country’s largest media network, and pursued relentless legal battles against journalists like Maria Ressa, a Nobel Peace Prize winner, who was persecuted for exposing corruption and human rights abuses. The press crackdown made the Philippines one of the most dangerous countries for journalists, further weakening democratic institutions.
The humanitarian cost extended to mass displacement. Military crackdowns in Mindanao, particularly during the Marawi Siege of 2017, resulted in over 350,000 internally displaced people. Many of them never received proper rehabilitation, leaving entire communities devastated. These policies also damaged the Philippines’ international standing, leading to economic sanctions and reduced trade incentives from global organisations such as the European Union and the United Nations.
In Peru, Fujimori’s military-led counterinsurgency campaigns resulted in tens of thousands of forced disappearances and human rights violations, many of which remain unresolved decades later.
If Nigeria continues on this trajectory, politically motivated arrests, violent crackdowns, and a worsening human rights situation may become the norm.
This should serve as a warning to Nigeria. If democratic institutions are undermined, political repression and human rights abuses will likely follow. Press freedom is already under threat, and if the government continues down this path, Nigeria could see an increase in politically motivated arrests, violent crackdowns on dissent, and a humanitarian crisis similar to what unfolded in the Philippines.
Defending Nigeria’s Democracy
To prevent Nigeria from slipping further into authoritarianism, it is crucial to strengthen democratic institutions. The judiciary and legislature must assert their independence and resist executive overreach. Civil society groups and legal experts should take a more proactive stance by challenging unconstitutional actions in court. Ensuring the resilience of these institutions is essential to maintaining a balance of power and upholding democratic governance.
According to Professor Adekunle Olatunji, a Professor of Political Science at the Federal University Oye Ekiti (FUOYE), institutional independence is fundamental to democratic survival.
He argues that “a weak judiciary emboldens the executive to act with impunity, undermining the principle of checks and balances. However, asserting judicial independence is not merely about legal frameworks. It requires a culture of resistance among judges and lawmakers.”
He emphasises that the National Assembly must move beyond being a “rubber-stamp institution” and actively hold the executive accountable. The judiciary, on its part, must interpret the law “without fear or favour, even in the face of political pressure.” This, he asserts, is the only way to ensure that Nigeria’s democratic institutions do not erode under executive dominance.
Preventing future abuses of power also requires urgent legal reforms. The current state of emergency laws need to be reviewed to prevent misuse and ensure they are not exploited for political gain. Additionally, electoral reforms should reinforce safeguards against executive interference in state governance.
South Africa’s experience provides another crucial lesson. Professor Olatunji notes how the country’s judiciary has repeatedly served as a bulwark against executive overreach.
“The Constitutional Court in South Africa has nullified unlawful executive actions, reinforcing the principle that no individual is above the law. Nigeria must take lessons from such models if we are to preserve our democracy,” he says.
He further stresses the role of civil society, legal scholars, and the media in ensuring unconstitutional actions are met with swift legal challenges.
Professor Chibuzo Nwankwo, a Professor of History and International Relations at FUOYE, warns that Nigeria’s struggles with executive dominance are not new but part of a recurring historical pattern. He explains that:
“The erosion of democratic norms in Nigeria is not an isolated phenomenon but part of a broader historical pattern where weak institutions create fertile ground for authoritarian tendencies. Historically, Nigeria’s democratic experiments have been plagued by executive dominance, often facilitated by constitutional loopholes and the absence of strong institutional checks.”
Professor Nwankwo points to global examples of countries that have successfully navigated similar challenges. He notes that Chile, for instance, transitioned from dictatorship to democracy through stringent military accountability laws. “If Nigeria is to avoid repeating the cycles of democratic decline seen in its past, urgent electoral and legal reforms are necessary,” he warns. Without such measures, state of emergency laws could become tools for authoritarian rule rather than genuine instruments of national security.
Nigeria’s experience with democratic governance has demonstrated both resilience and fragility. Without strong institutions, legal safeguards, and historical awareness, Nwankwo notes that the country risks slipping further into authoritarian tendencies.
“History may repeat itself, and the democratic progress made since 1999 could unravel before our eyes,” he cautions.
